The changing boundaries of the American hospital process of rapid and fundamental change. Long the central institution of the health care delivery system, the hospital is being challenged by important developments in epidemiology, technology, and economics. Individually and collectively, these changes threaten to push the hospital to the margins of the system, leaving most medical services and dollars controlled by "accountable health partnerships" that emphasize outpatient, home health, and subacute care. Alternatively, these environmental changes could provide a window of opportunity for the hospital to embark on a new mission as a health care center without walls. Already, many hospitals have diversified into ambulatory diagnostic and surgery centers, home health agencies, nursing-home facilities, and myriad other services that have few direct links to acute inpatient care. The delivery system of the 21st century might remain centered around the hospital, albeit in a vertically integrated system where acute care beds play only a modest role.
from the bureaucratic inertias, technological imperatives, high wages, and regulatory controls of large hospital institutions, these organizations emphasize accessibility, economy, and often a more intimate setting.
Through chain affiliations, franchise contracts, and other network linkages, they are able to achieve many economies of scale and scope without incurring heavy investments in hospital plant and equipment.
The hospitals' financial and political environment is also changing rapidly. Public and private purchasers increasingly seek to negotiate with health care organizations capable of providing all services for a predetermined capitation payment. Some of these integrated organizations will be created by hospital systems or will acquire hospitals, but others will prefer to avoid the risks inherent in hospital ownership and will contract for inpatient services. In economic parlance, they will "buy" rather than "make" acute inpatient care.
In this article, I will analyze hospital integration into outpatient, home health, and subacute care services through the conceptual framework of transactions cost economics. Between 1972 and 1990 , acute care facilities diversified rapidly, but significant areas of health care remain outside the boundaries of the hospital organization. This raises important questions concerning the limits of market contracting and, conversely, the limits of vertical integration. Contrary to experiences in the manufacturing and other nonhealth sectors of the economy, investments in specialized physical assets cannot explain vertical integration by hospitals. Decisions to expand into outpatient, home health, and subacute services serve as controls on potentially opportunistic and uncooperative behavior by independent firms in an era of prospective payment and heightened public concern over quality and accessibility of services.
A Pattern of Selective Expansion
The dynamics of change are everywhere to be seen. Epidemiological patterns continue to shift the burden of disease from acute episodes requiring hospitalization to chronic conditions most effectively treated in outpatient settings, the patient's home, or subacute care facilities. Dramatic developments in diagnostic and therapeutic technologies are permitting an ever-increasing portion of health care procedures to be done noninvasively, eliminating the need for overnight stays. , 1972-90 1972 1982 1990 Number of hospitals 5,843 5,801 5,384
Acute inpatient services Beds 859, 344 968, 807 867, 361 Days 235, 608, 458 262, 549, 209 206, 134, 844, 916 Dramatic though the evidence is of hospital expansion into nontraditional activities, it is important to emphasize the types of expansion that are not occurring. We do not observe backward integration of even the largest hospital chains into the manufacture of pharmaceuticals, radiological equipment, or surgical instruments, much less into the production of more humble components such as bandages, linen, and diapers.
The types of integration we do observe are often only partial: some hospitals decide to buy a service through market contract, whereas others decide to offer the service themselves through unified ownership and control. This selectivity in hospital integration determines the boundaries of the institution and requires explanation. We can be satisfied neither with a theory that predicts hospitals will invariably fail in efforts to move beyond their acute care core nor with one that predicts hospitals will expand without limits in pursuit of empire.
The Limits of the Hospital Some medical care services are invariably found in hospitals, some are never found in hospitals, and others are found both inside and outside of hospital settings. Moreover, the distribution of services has changed markedly over time, and is rapidly shifting now. As a first step toward a theory capable of explaining the changing boundaries of the hospital, it is illuminating to pose two sets of questions, inspired by Coase (1937 The conventional explanation for diversification into related services is the pursuit of economies of scope. Two services are subject to economies of scope if the integrated production of both is cheaper than their production independently (Willig 1979) . Textbook examples include the joint production of mutton and wool, milk and cheese, and automobiles and trucks.
The limits of this technological explanation are clear: economies of scope are neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for multiproduct diversification by a particular firm. Teece (1980) shows that scope economies by themselves are not a sufficient explanation for diversification by posing the question of the contractual alternative. If the technology necessary to produce one service is not fully utilized, and could be employed to produce another service as well, why must this excess capacity be used by the firm itself (through diversification) rather than leased to another firm? For example, a hospital with excess capacity due to declining admissions for acute care services need not open its own subacute care unit. In principle, it could contract with an independent firm (e.g., a nursing-home chain) to develop a subacute care facility in the unused space. By extension, hospitals are not prevented by technology alone from contracting for rather than owning radiology, laboratory, and other clinical services directly related to inpatient care, to say nothing of comparatively unrelated ambulatory surgery and home health services. The explanation for hospital ownership of these services must be sought in contractual, not merely technological, directions (Mick and Conrad 1988) .
Even more important, perhaps, is the fact that economies of scope are not a necessary condition for diversification into new services. This is evident in the case of conglomerate diversification, where corporations simultaneously pursue technologically independent product lines. Especially striking are cases of diversification in the face of diseconomies of scope, where producing two services simultaneously is more expensive than pro-
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This content downloaded from 169.229.32.36 on Thu, 26 May 2016 22:13:19 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms ducing independently. Input costs are likely to be higher for hospitalowned outpatient, home health, and nursing-home services than for comparable nonhospital organizations. Wage rates are more generous for nurses, technicians, clerical workers, janitors, and other staff in hospitalowned facilities than in independent physician offices, nursing homes, and home health agencies. Hospitals tend to employ a more intensive style of practice than independent nursing homes and physician offices, and thus experience higher costs, even after taking wages and other input prices into account. There is considerable policy debate over the potential "medicalization" of long-term care if it falls under the control of acute care hospitals. Furthermore, bureaucratic organization often attenuates incentives and reduces performance. This is the reason for the franchising rather than unified ownership of auto dealerships, chain restaurants, and many other service networks. Efforts to introduce marketlike compensation mechanisms into vertically integrated and diversified firms may lead to undesirable responses, such as overuse of capital equipment owned by the parent firm and disputes over appropriate internal pricing and accounting (Williamson 1985) . The potential for opportunistic cost and revenue accounting is very strong between the inpatient and outpatient or subacute care divisions of a diversified hospital organization.
Transactions Cost Economics
Transactions cost economics interprets the limits of both the market and the firm in terms of the relative efficiency of each organizational type in producing and distributing the services in question. External procurement through markets and internal production within firms are viewed as alternative modes of accomplishing a similar set of tasks. Organizational forms are interpreted as governance structures that offer various remedies for and protections against the pervasive uncertainty and opportunism of economic relations. Particular types of transactions come to be handled under particular organizational forms, depending on the relative costs of so doing. These costs are determined not only by technological factors, but also by the legal structure, tax and regulatory incentives, and cultural patterns.
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Site-Specific Assets
Some technologically distinct processes are performed most efficiently when placed immediately adjacent to one another, leading to economies of time and transportation costs. Because they are technologically distinct, they can be under separate ownership, yet connected through market contracting. The physical location, however, which reduces contracting costs with the proximate firm, nevertheless increases the costs of contracting with all others. This creates risks from opportunistic behavior. The difference between the cost of production when contracting with the adjacent firm, rather than a nonadjacent one, can be expropriated by the adjacent firm through price increases or changes in other contractual terms. Site-specific assets of this type frequently result in unified ownership. Where vertical integration is impossible for legal or other reasons, stable, long-term contractual relations often occur (Joskow 1985 (Harris 1977) .
Site specificity, stemming from the need to economize on time, has historically figured prominently in extending the hospital boundaries to encompass the ancillary services necessary for acute inpatient care. In large urban areas, it will probably play less of a future role. Location of outpatient, home health, and subacute services geographically adjacent to the acute care facility creates few efficiencies and may induce inefficiencies in input costs and practice styles. Transportation time will continue to exert an important influence on hospital boundaries in rural areas, however, because these areas support only one or two hospitals and one or two health plans. Health plans and hospitals are inevitably engaged in a process of small numbers bargaining or, at the extreme, of bilateral monopoly. Each is essential to the other, creating the basis for cooperation. However, each has different interests in the allocation of available resources between inpatient and other services, creating the potential for mutually destructive conflict.
In instances of true bilateral monopoly, the legal specifics of the relationship between the hospital and the health plan will be relatively unimportant. Long-term contracting and unified ownership will achieve similar results because each entity is similarly situated. In this context, one would expect the hospital to diversify unopposed into outpatient, home health, and subacute care to the extent that there exists adequate consumer demand for these services. Hospitals in noncompetitive rural markets have not progressed as far down the path of technological duplication and wage inflation as their urban counterparts (Robinson and Luft 1988; Robinson 1988) , and thus suffer fewer diseconomies of scope when diversifying into nontraditional services. The paucity of outpatient, home health, and nursing-home alternatives eliminates any advantages a health plan might have gained from selective contracting and price competition. The local medical culture may reinforce a cooperative, rather than a competitive, attitude among the various types of health care services. Empirical research is clearly needed, but the following hypothesis seems reasonable: Whereas hospitals in urban areas will be more diversified than rural hospitals in absolute terms, owing to the larger population base they serve, they will comprise smaller relative shares of the local markets for outpatient, home health, and subacute care.
Reputational Assets
Consumers purchase many goods and services whose quality they are unable to evaluate directly. Prior to purchase, most of us are unable to measure meaningfully the quality of electronic equipment, fresh fruit, and medical care. If convinced of high quality, we are generally willing to pay a higher price than we would otherwise. Producers often find it profitable to invest resources in developing a reputation for high quality.
This investment in reputational or "brand name" capital raises costs but also revenues. It need not shed direct light on the features of a particular commodity, but may reinforce the consumer's image of the producer as unlikely to shade quality whenever detection is unlikely. These investments serve as commitments to continued high-quality service because the value of the investment would be lost if consumers encountered shoddy products (Klein and Leffler 1981) .
Firms not only make investments to build up a reputation for quality, but they also seek opportunities to gain new marketing advantages from preexisting reputational capital. Firms with established reputations in one product line can add a new one and enjoy the benefits of a higher consumer confidence than is achievable by an unknown producer. Of course, the newly integrated firm must take actions to ensure the quality of its new product line because the value of its original reputation is at stake. The cost of these actions, however, may be considerably lower than the cost of achieving a comparable reputation for an independent firm. Franchising is a means for a firm with an established reputation to guarantee the quality of a particular product, such as the service offered by franchisees, so they institute detailed controls on price, quality, and amenities (Hadfield 1990 ).
The past 20 years have witnessed concern in policy circles over the rapid diffusion and "duplication" among hospitals of high-cost inpatient services such as open heart surgery, cardiac catheterization, and advanced radiological technologies. Some economists have sought to explain the dynamics of inpatient service diffusion through the model of the "medical arms race" (Luft et al. 1986 ). Hospitals compete for patients indirectly by competing for physician staff affiliations, which is accomplished through the acquisition of specialized clinical technologies.
This model can be interpreted in terms of hospital investments in reputational or brand-name capital. Individual technologies may be acquired for the overall cachet of technological preparedness they offer to the hospital, rather than solely for the admission of patients who actually will use these services. Acquisition of an open-heart surgery facility may increase admissions for cholecystectomy.
Reputation effects may explain much of hospital diversification into ambulatory and home health services. The hospital can use its established reputation for quality in inpatient care as a credible commitment to maintaining quality in outpatient care. As the intensity of treatments offered on an outpatient basis has increased, so has consumer concern about quality. When integrating into ambulatory and home health services, the hospital is placing its entire reputation at stake, and thereby announces a commitment to monitor and control the quality of its new services. This perspective suggests that hospitals will not seek ownership of services for which, although quality problems are of concern, the hospital has no effective means to monitor and control performance, as in the case of some forms of home health care.
Dedicated Capacity
Unpredictable fluctuations in supplies and consumer demand create problems of inventory and capacity utilization. Vertically integrated firms can maintain excess capacity in one unit to absorb sudden increases in output from other units, but find this costly. Nonintegrated firms can contract with other entities to maintain excess capacity for their needs,
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The firm that maintains the excess capacity will lose the revenue it could otherwise have obtained by selling that capacity to other users, if the contracting user finds some excuse to renege on its agreement. The firm that contracts for the capacity will be forced to pay a higher spot-market price for other space if the contracting seller opportunistically reallocates the space to another bidder. Dedicated capacity problems are particularly evident in integrated production processes where interruptions caused by insufficient capacity at the next stage are costly (Goldberg and Erickson 1987) .
Hospital care is in many ways an integrated production process. Patients are often evaluated on an outpatient basis, treated in the acute inpatient facility, and then transferred to subacute care in a nursing home or hospice. Lack of available subacute beds causes patients to be held in the acute care beds, which carry much higher daily costs. Hospital lengths of stay are longer in metropolitan areas with few nursing-home beds than in areas with many nursing-home beds (Kenney and Holahan 1991) . As long as hospitals were paid on a retrospective basis, the high costs of acute bed utilization by candidates for subacute care could be passed on to insurance companies and Medicare. With the advent of prospective payment and hospital utilization controls, however, the costs of insufficient nursing-home capacity must be absorbed by the hospital.
Hospitals and nursing homes have opposite incentives to maintain excess subacute care capacity. Hospitals need to have subacute care beds available on precisely the day when patients can be discharged from the acute care facility. Nursing homes, however, are profitable only when they maintain full utilization of capacity. In principle, this divergence of interest could be handled by agreements for the nursing home to maintain full bed utilization but to discharge a resident whenever the hospital needs a subacute bed. Such arrangements are very difficult, however. 
Conclusion
The U.S. health care system faces a massive restructuring, and boundaries are changing both for hospitals and for every other organizational type. It is impossible to give a full account of the hospital's role in out-patient services, home health, and long-term care without analyzing the turbulent events enveloping other participants, particularly physicians and insurers. This larger discussion, when it occurs, must benefit from the rapidly evolving interdisciplinary science of organization, which draws heavily from economics, sociology, political science, and law. We need a more robust positive theory of how health care organizations evolve in response to changes in epidemiology, payment incentives, and the larger political environment. As I have argued here, contractual as well as technological factors will play major roles. Most important, we need a convincing normative framework to guide public policies concerning reimbursement mechanisms, licensing and accreditation standards, criteria for evaluating quality, and methods for ensuring access to services. We must be willing to rethink the system and not accept as selfevident the existing boundaries, which evolved during a period when the institutional environment rewarded professional dominance, costinsensitive consumer choice, and organizational hypertrophy.
